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A continuous service innovation such as Cloud Computing is highly attractive in the business-to-business
world because it brings the service provider both billions of dollars in profits and superior competitive
advantage. The success of such an innovation is strongly tied to a consumer’s adoption decision. When
dealing with a continuous service innovation, the consumer’s decision process becomes complicated. Not
only do consumers need to consider two different decisions of both whether to adopt and how long to adopt
(contract length), but also the increasing trend of the service-related technological improvements invokes a
forward-looking behavior in consumer’s decision process. Moreover, consumers have to balance the benefits
and costs of adoption when evaluating decision alternatives. Consumer adoption decisions come with the
desire to have the latest technology and the fear of the adopted technology becoming obsolete. Non-adoption
prevents consumers from being locked-in by the service provider, but buying that technology may be costly.
Being bound to a longer contract forfeits the opportunity to capitalize on the technological revolution.
Frequently signing shorter contracts increases the non-physical efforts such as learning, training and
negotiating costs. Targeting the right consumers at the right time with the right service offer in the businessto-business context requires an efficient strategy of sales resource allocation. This is a “mission impossible”
for service providers if they do not know how consumers make decisions regarding service innovation. In
order to guide the resource allocation decisions, we propose a complex model that integrates the structural,
dynamic, and learning approaches to understand the consumer’s decision process on both whether or not to
adopt, and how long to adopt a continuously updating service innovation in a B2B context.
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Modeling the Dynamic Decision of a Contractual Adoption of
a Continuous Innovation in B2B Market

Abstract
A continuous service innovation such as Cloud Computing is highly attractive in the
business-to-business world because it brings the service provider both billions of dollars in profits
and superior competitive advantage. The success of such an innovation is strongly tied to a
consumer’s adoption decision. When dealing with a continuous service innovation, the consumer’s
decision process becomes complicated. Not only do consumers need to consider two different
decisions of both whether to adopt and how long to adopt (contract length), but also the increasing
trend of the service-related technological improvements invokes a forward-looking behavior in
consumer’s decision process. Moreover, consumers have to balance the benefits and costs of
adoption when evaluating decision alternatives. Consumer adoption decisions come with the desire
to have the latest technology and the fear of the adopted technology becoming obsolete. Nonadoption prevents consumers from being locked-in by the service provider, but buying that
technology may be costly. Being bound to a longer contract forfeits the opportunity to capitalize on
the technological revolution. Frequently signing shorter contracts increases the non-physical efforts
such as learning, training and negotiating costs. Targeting the right consumers at the right time with
the right service offer in the business-to-business context requires an efficient strategy of sales
resource allocation. This is a “mission impossible” for service providers if they do not know how
consumers make decisions regarding service innovation. In order to guide the resource allocation
decisions, we propose a complex model that integrates the structural, dynamic, and learning
approaches to understand the consumer’s decision process on both whether or not to adopt, and how
long to adopt a continuously updating service innovation in a B2B context.
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Keywords: continuous innovation, service innovation, B2B hi-tech markets, dynamic
programming, bellman equation, learning process, structural model.

Introduction
We are living in an era that is continuously innovating. According to the famous Moore’s
law(Moore, 1965), most of the high-tech related devices, such as CPU speed, hardware size, and
memory capacity etc, shows exponential improvement rate over year. In recent decades, the speed
of innovation in the hi-tech markets creates turbulence in not only people’s everyday life but also in
the global business environment. In people’s everyday life, cell phones significantly improve the
way that people communicate with each other and internet dramatically change people’s lives which
were imaged before. In today’s business world, enterprises find few opportunities to grow or even
survive without applying the most advanced technology to their own networks. The inevitable
consequence of rapid innovation in the high-tech market is that not only does the IT person’s
burden becomes heavier, but also the resources that firms have to spend on the IT department grows
significantly.
Under such situation, cloud computing service walks into the B2B high-tech service market.
Cloud computing is a high-tech delivery service provided through internet aiming at transferring the
traditional IT burden to the service provider thus saving the business customers’ internal IT cost.
Cloud computing targets at including all potential IT services such as data processing and storage,
employee profile management, software and hardware development, information integration,
communication/networking security etc. Because of the emerging of the cloud computing services,
whatever the internal IT department is doing, the B2B customers now have the option to shift to
service provider for the 3 potential reasons: the specific feature of expertise; the less cost involved
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and relatively easier and quicker to scale up and down. Therefore, there is a lot of incentive to go
through the adoption.
Although the cloud concept was introduced in 1960s, it becomes realization and popular
only around late 2000s after the internet become prevalent. From the launch to present, cloud
service shows remarkable market potential. Announced by IBM in 2011, more than 80% of the
Fortune 500 companies become their cloud adopters, which include multiple industries such as
airlines, cars, financing, insurance and supermarket (Tomasco, 2011).

And the global cloud

market size is predicted to reach 19.5 Billion by 2016 (Columbus, 2013).
In order to catch up with the fast changing business environment, many firms turn to
purchase high-tech services from pioneering high-tech providers, which makes a continuous service
innovation highly attractive in the business-to-business world because it brings the service providers
both billions of dollars in profits and superior competitive advantage. Moreover, although cloud
computing is a promising and attractive service in the B2B high-tech market, certain concerns, such
as security, capability, privacy and integrity still exists among cloud adopters. Most of the
concerns, fundamentally, are centered on the technological level of the cloud service. Therefore,
the technology improvement is always the key feature to alleviate customer’s concern, for example,
increasing the data processing speed and storage size, introduce new methods to improve the
security of the communication environment, build new data center to enhance the global connection
etc. All those improvement, we define as continuous innovation or “sustained improvement” in our
paper.
There is no doubt that the success of such a continuous innovation is strongly tied to a
consumer’s adoption decision. In such a unique and novelty hi-tech market, some potential
problems require answers. First is, if the technology level keeps on updating, how the service
provider should manage such continuous innovation? Specifically, should the service providers
3

gather all the improvements and publicize them together to alert customers, or should the service
providers gradually announce each step of their innovation progress to remind customers? Second
is, how would the evolved technology impact B2B customers’ decision? In order to answer these
questions, we will have to understand customers’ behaviors and decision process, which is not easy
task because:
1) When dealing with a continuous service innovation, the consumer’s decision process
becomes complicated. Not only do consumers need to consider whether to adopt and how long to
adopt (contract length), but also the increasing trend of the service-related technological
improvements invokes a forward-looking behavior in the consumer’s decision process.
2) Consumers have to balance the benefits and costs when evaluating the decision
alternatives. Consumer adoption decisions come with the desire of having the latest technology and
the fear of the adopted technology becoming obsolete. Non-adoption prevents consumers from
being locked-in by the service provider, but buying that technology may be costly. When they are
bound to a longer contract, they forfeit the opportunity to capitalize on the technological revolution.
Frequently signing shorter contracts increases the non-physical efforts such as learning, training and
negotiating costs.
Therefore, targeting the right consumers at the right time with the right service offer in the
business-to-business context requires an efficient strategy of sales resource allocation. This is a
“mission impossible” for service providers if they do not know how consumers make decisions
regarding service innovation. In order to guide the resource allocation decisions, we propose a
complex model that integrates the structural, dynamic, and learning approaches to understand the
consumer’s decision process on both whether or not to adopt, and how long to adopt a continuously
updating service innovation in a B2B context. Our study offers both modeling contribution and
substantive insights into an emerging, promising and continuously updating high-tech service B2B
4

market. Our major modeling contribution is; different from adding covariates in the modeling
framework; we structurally model customer decision process in a continuous innovation hi-tech
B2B market. Specifically,
1) We simultaneously model customer’s two layer decision: whether and how long to buy.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to integrate both learning and forward-looking
in the customer’s two layer decision, especially the continuous decision of how long to buy.
2) Using the structural model approach, we are able to quantify the underlying relationship
between customer’s decision and technology evolution. And we evaluate the impacts of
technology evolution on customer’s decision. Specifically, we are able evaluate how the two states
of technology evolution could separately influence customer’s decision process: one is overall
technology level; the other is the technology evolution pace.
3) Finally we integrate both contract length and technology evolution into the dynamic
programming process to structurally explain customer’s dynamic decision process.
From substantive perspective, our model parameter estimation and policy simulation are
very valuable for aiding firm’s decision making. Based on our results, firms can know under
different scenario, what strategy will be better choice. Our findings suggest that:
1) If a service provider expected the customers to try and purchase their new service, it will
be better for the service provider to either select evenly distributed but relatively smaller steps of
technology improvement or reduce the effort of signing a contract by offering customers some
additional help. This way, customers show higher purchase intention although the contract length
they signed is relatively shorter.
2) On the other hand, if a service provider is more willing to reap better profit from the
customers, the better choice will be announcing less frequently but more influential technology
improvement or providing relatively rigid policy for customers to make purchase. This way,
5

although customer’s purchase intention is relatively low, customers tend more likely to sign a
longer contract once make the purchase decision.
3) Since we also provide quantitatively evaluation on the customer’s decision changes under
different scenario, firms can combine with their internal profit function with our result to design the
optimal strategy.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. We summarize the prior research on
customer’s forward-looking behaviors. We both discuss the development of modeling approach on
forward-looking dynamics model and point out the research gap in the existing research that our
study can contribute to. Then we propose our structural modeling approach on customer’s decision
process in the continuous innovation hi-tech market. Specifically, we explain how we integrate
both the customer’s two-layer decisions and technology evolution in the dynamic programming to
account for consumer’s forward looking behavior, which is one of our major modeling contribution.
Then we specify the modeling estimation process including both value function simulation and
likelihood estimation. Since we don’t have close-form results, our modeling estimation process is
based on the empirical solution. Following this, we will describe the data set we used, then discuss
our model estimation result and policy simulation. Next, we conclude with our modeling
contribution and managerial implication. Finally, we provide the study limitation and future
research directions.

Literature Review
Our study belongs to the research stream of modeling the consumer’s dynamic decision
process in the high technology service market by taking into account forward looking behavior. The
research stream began with the study of Guadagni and Little (1983) who utilized a multinomial logit
approach to capture a consumer’s choice between alternative brands. The decision process in the
6

study is referred to as a static decision as compared to forward looking decisions because the it
assumes that the consumers make choice decisions based only on their current utility. The
fundamental modeling approach of the study is still rely on adding major explanatory variables to
predict consumer’s brand choice on consumer package goods. Therefore, this model can capture
the probability of choice as a function of alternative attributes, such as price, promotion, and
consumer loyalty etc. Although the study still relies on the current utility to model a consumer’s
choices, it lays the foundation for future dynamic modeling approaches. And the modeling idea of
keeping the variable coefficients the same across different brand sizes shed light on the concept of
modern structural model.
Recent studies pertain to the reality of the assumption behind the static modeling approach
because consumers usually not only consider the current utility but also take into account the
expectation on future utilities when making purchase decisions. For example, consumers can hold
their current purchase decision when expecting an upcoming promotion season in order to get a
better price cut. In this situation, consumers will show forward looking behaviors in their decision
process. Moreover, consumers can learn from different sources of information or experiences and
update their beliefs about the products/services, which in turn, will also impact their decision
process.
The idea of “forward-looking behavior” was firstly appeared in a “regenerative optimal
stopping model” introduced by Rust’s study (Rust, 1987). The so-called “dynamic programming”
approach was applied to determine an optimal decision for bus engine replacement. The
fundamental concept of the “optimal stopping rule” is that, the decision of whether or not should the
Bus maintenance replaces the bus engine at a certain time period is determined by two forces: one is
the required maintenance cost; the other is the unexpected engine failure in the future.
Consequently, to optimize the current maintenance decision, we will have to integrate the future
7

discounted value into the current decision process, which is typically the “forward-looking”
behavior. Similar idea and the “optimal stopping” model is applied to the new and used car market
(Schiraldi, 2011) to quantify the trade-in effect on consumer’s decision process.
Erdem and Keane (1996) demonstrated a structural modeling approach that embeds both
forward looking dynamics and the Bayesian learning process. Different from the static model which
only relates consumer’s decision with current utility maximization, the “forward-looking” dynamic
model considers that consumer’s choice is determined by the maximization of the expected utility
over a time zone. Furthermore, through the Bayesian learning process, the model can capture the
influences of a consumer’s past usage experience and advertising exposure on the consumer’s
choice between alternative brands. Through the combination of forward-looking dynamics and the
Bayesian learning process, the model can evaluate the impact of a firm’s marketing strategy on the
consumer’s brand choices in both the short and long run. In the paper, the authors explicitly define
the “structure” model which aims at deriving the underlying relationship between consumer’s
choice and the marketing attributes based on the specification of consumer’s purchase behaviors.
Using structural modeling approach, pointed out by the authors, we can drive reliable policy
evaluation because the parameters in the structural model are considered as the intrinsic preference
of the consumers thus the parameter estimation doesn’t vary with the policy change.

Therefore,

Erdem and Keane (1996)’s paper serves as the milestone to combine forward looking behavior and
learning process to structurally model customer’s decision process.
Following the distinct study in 1996, Erdem and Keane spent efforts on enrich the dynamic
learning model framework. For example, the distinct study only considered the brand choice as the
decision variable (Erdem and Keane, 1996). To improve the decision complexity, they integrated
both brand and quantity choice into the dynamic model and aimed at finding the effect of price
fluctuation on the consumer’s decision process (Erdem, 2003). Although this paper didn’t put the
8

quantity as a continuous decision but divide it into discrete level of choices in the model, it signaled
to us the idea that the dynamic model is not limited to the discrete choice but applicable to the
continuous decision as well. Moreover, in the distinct study, consumer’s utility was defined as a
function of price and consumer experienced attributes (e.g. quality) which was recovered by a
normal distribution (Erdem and Keane, 1996). To enrich both the utility function and the consumer
learning process, Erdem et al. introduced both price and advertisement to help quantifying the
consumer experienced product quality (Erdem et al., 2008). Moreover, when dealing with high-tech
product brand choice and if we can obtain data related to consumer’s information search, we are
able to develop the “active learning” model which can quantify: to what extent that consumer gather
the information can actually invoke an actual purchase decision (Erdem et al., 2005).
Using similar idea and modeling approach as the distinct study (Erdem and Keane, 1996),
Ackerberg (2001, 2003) developed a dynamic learning model using data from consumer package
goods (e.g. Yogurt). Different from Erdem and Keane’s (1996) study that only exam the
“informative” effect of advertising on consumer’s decision process, this study separately evaluate
three effects of advertising: informative, prestige and image. Although Ackerberg’s study had
limited modeling contribution, it pointed out an important feature of dynamic model which is
capable of separately quantifying the multi-dimensional effects of one attribute on consumer’s
decision process.
Following the promising study, modeling the consumer’s forward-looking dynamic decision
process under different marketing contexts becomes prevalent. Most studies focus on modeling the
price-initiated forward-looking behaviors in a B2C consumer’s binary decision process, e.g.,
whether the consumer will buy or not buy a product.
Gönül and Srinivasan (1996) applied structural dynamic programming approach to model
whether consumers will adjust their purchasing behaviors on consumer package good (e.g.
9

disposable diaper product) when they have expectation on future product promotions. The central
idea of the model setup is that, consumer’s forward-looking behavior is triggered by the potential
cost of the product. Therefore, as rational consumers, in order to maximize their expected utility of
purchase, they will have to consider the future cost in the promotion season. Although
acknowledge the advantages of structural forward-looking dynamic model, the authors (Gönül and
Srinivasan, 1996) also pointed out a potential limitation of the model – computation cost, which can
significantly limit the state variables that we can include in the model.
Other than consumer package good, many structural dynamic models were built on
consumer durable goods, especially the high-tech products. The reason is that the rapid
development of product related features, such as product quality, and the obviously declined price
of the existing products serve as the perfect triggers of consumer’s forward looking behavior. For
example, Song and Chintagunta (2003) investigated the interesting phenomena in Camera (e.g.
high-tech durable good) market that the price of the new camera in the market continuously drops
over time. The price declination invokes consumer’s forward-looking behavior, which affects their
current decisions. Reflected in the model, consumers will adjust their actual purchase time in order
to maximize the expectation of both current utility and future discounted utilities. Because of the
forward-looking behaviors, the present variation of the price of the product can not only influence
consumer’s current purchases but also alter their future decisions (Song and Chintagunta, 2003).
Using similar idea that price decline over time triggers customer’s forward-looking
behavior, Sriram et.al (2010) extended the model in Song and Chintagunta’s study (2003) into
individual level data from three categories of high-tech durable products. The major finding of the
study is that, consumer’s forward-looking behaviors can be interactional. Consequently, the price
decline of one product category can change consumer’s purchasing behavior not only within the
category but also across the categories.
10

Ryan and Tucker’s study (2012) also focus on using dynamic model to understand
individual-level consumer’s decision process on adopting high-tech product (e.g. video-calling
technology). The interesting part of the study is that, it brings in the idea that the network evolution
can play an important role in determining the consumer’s dynamic decision process. Therefore,
consumer’s forward-looking behavior is no longer the “patent” of price or cost of the product, but
can be closely related to the evolution of the technology related to the product.
Although dynamic model is a promising modeling approach, its modeling framework is
more complicated and its estimation process requires more computing burden than the static
models. Therefore, to dispel the suspects on the necessity of using dynamic model over static
model to understand consumer’s decision, many studies spent efforts on showing the advantages
and benefits of dynamic model. For example, based on still the high-tech durable product (e.g.
digital camcorder), Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) integrate both product quality elevation and
product price decline in modeling consumer’s dynamic demand. Other than showing the estimation
and analysis of consumer’s dynamic preference toward the product, the authors also confirmed that
the dynamic model yield more realistic results than the static approach. Hendel and Nevo (2006)
also pointed out that, although price cut, such as promotion or deals, usually is a temporary action
for many products, it can create a long-term effect on consumers’ decision. The estimation of the
long-term effect can be significantly biased if we omit the dynamic behavior features in our
modeling approach (Hendel and Nevo, 2006). Using forward-looking dynamic model to quantify
consumer’s brand switch behavior, Sun et al. (2003) also found that dynamic model can provide
unbiased estimation on the brand-switch elasticity thus has better model-fit than the reduced-form
model. And the biased estimation issue in the reduced-form model can’t be solved by adding
covariates. Moreover, in another study, Sun claimed that the forward-looking dynamic model is
able to identify the behavioral link between the promotion and consumer’s consumption decision
11

even though the decision variable is endogenous (Sun, 2005). Using data from computer printer
market, Melnikov (2012) built logit-based discrete choice model integrating both forward-looking
dynamics and endogenous prices. His study not long empirically confirmed the existence of
consumer’s forward-looking behaviors, but also showed the better performance of dynamic model
on both forecasting consumer’s demand and measuring the benefits of new products than the static
model.
In the high-tech product market, structural dynamic model can be applied to not only new
product adoption but also other type of purchasing pattern. For example, Gordon (2009) addressed
that, in product replacement (e.g. PC processor) purchases, consumer’s dynamic decision process
can be trigger by the obsolescence status of the product due to both the quality elevation and price
reduction. Lewis (2004) utilized the discrete-choice dynamic model using data from online grocery
and drug items to solve customer’s sequential choices when facing loyalty program. In the paper,
other than the price-related marketing mix attributes, the author claimed that the loyalty program
can also incite customer’s forward-looking behaviors because the benefits of the program are
determined by the overall spending over time.
Different from studying consumer package goods or durable goods, Yang and Ching (2013)
built a structural dynamic programming model to understand consumer’s decision process on
adopting and using ATM cards. Although the authors still followed the basic concept of
establishing forward-looking structural model, they addressed an interesting result of identifying the
impact of consumer’s age on their forward-looking zones. The idea is that, compared with younger
people, elder people have relatively shorter forward-looking zones, thus they receive lesser
expected utility from adopting a new product which requires a certain level of adoption cost, such as
learning cost. Consequently, elder people can be more reluctant to learn and adopt the product.
Although this study still focus on the discrete choice of whether to adopt or use the ATM card
12

which limit its modeling contribution, the idea of the length of forward-looking zones shed light on
our study to integrate continuous decision into the forward-looking structural model.
The dynamic modeling approach not only can quantify the direct effects of attributes, such
as price, promotion, quantify and advertising etc., on the consumer decision process, but also is able
to identify the indirect effects. Gowrisankaran et al. (2011) applied the dynamic model on data
from both DVD player and DVD titles markets and found that, consumers with forward-looking
behaviors may form expectation on the future benefits in the DVD title market thus make multiple
purchase on DVD players over time. This study pointed out a research direction of applying the
dynamic model in complimentary product markets to understand consumers’ decision process in
both market simultaneously.
Forward-looking dynamic model can also be applied to service market. It is widely
acknowledged that switching cost is a major consideration when consumers make decisions on the
service providers. Using data from different types of the service market, studies also found that,
switching cost can also influence consumer’s decision process through invoking consumer’s
forward-looking behaviors. Using data from cellular service industry, Kim (2006) firstly pointed
out that switching cost can be a source of consumer’s forward-looking behavior. Using data from
Medicare service market, Nosal (2011) addressed that switching cost significantly influence
consumers’ decision between advantage plan and original plan, and the amount of people choosing
advantage plan could be tripled if without the switching cost. Shcherbakov (2009) specifically
provided an estimation of switching costs of $109 and $186 for cable and satellite respectively in
television service market. Although our study focus was not the consumer’s switching behaviors,
our study context belongs to the service market and the cost of signing a service contract is an
important parameter that we need to estimate. The findings from these papers suggest that the
switching cost in the service market, although may not be fully observable, can be identified and
13

estimated in the dynamic model. Therefore, bringing the cost of signing a service contract in our
model setup (described later) is reasonable, convincible and estimable.
Other than understanding the dynamic decision process purely from consumer’s perspective,
using data from video-game market, Nair (2007) developed a dynamic modeling from both
consumer and firm’s perspective. From consumer’s perspective, consumers form a forward-looking
behaviors because of the of the price drop. From the firm’s perspective, firms are also forwardlooking in order to consider consumer’s dynamic behaviors when formulating the optimal price
strategy. The findings in the study suggests that, understanding consumer’s forward looking
behaviors can effectively help firm to design optimal pricing strategy thus better target the right
consumers at the right time with the right price. In our study, we only focus on studying
consumer’s decision process from consumer’s perspective. Therefore, we omit reviewing the
literature of dynamic models from firms’ perspective which belongs to another stream of modeling
stories.

Study Motivation
Although our study stems from the research stream of modeling consumer’s decision
process, our study possesses many unique characteristics in not only the modeling approaches but
also the application contexts (Table 1):
1) We propose an improved and holistic modeling framework for a service innovation in the
B2B hi-tech market. Being in the rapid developing high-tech market, a B2B consumer’s concern
will not only come from the cost of adopting the service but also the level and the pace of
continuously developing technology that they can receive from the service provider.
2) As we pointed out previously, in this high-tech service market, there is always a contact
associated with each individual purchase. This aspect suggests that, customer’s adoption decision
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has two layers, one is a discrete decision – whether to adopt and the other is a continuous decision
which is how much to adopt, e.g. contract length. In our study, we jointly model two different
decisions, e.g. a binary decision of whether to adopt and a continuous decision of how long to adopt
(contract length). Although considering multiple angles of consumer decision is very common in
static modeling approach (Chitaguanta 1993), up to now, binary decisions still dominate the forward
looking dynamic model built on consumer’s perspective. Moreover, there are some distinct features
in the market which makes the customer’s decision process unique in our study.
3) The first distinct feature in our study context is the physical cost of adopting the service,
which can be considered as the unit price of the service. From the previous literature review, we
know that price is a powerful factor that invokes a consumer’s forward looking behavior that
attracts most researchers’ interests. In the general high-tech markets, such as camera, computer,
printer, video-game etc, the price keeps on decreasing after the first release. This is one reason that
most studies using price as the trigger of customer’s forward looking behaviors. However, we raise
another important factor of technology evolution in our study. Through iterative discussion with the
managers, we realize that in our context, one distinct feature is that the physical cost of adopting the
service is primarily associated with the consumer’s need and will not show systematic changes
within years, but the service-associated technology level keeps on updating rapidly. This distinct
feature suggests that the unit price of the service is relatively consistent but the technology keep on
updating. Therefore, customer still form forward looking behaviors, however, such forward looking
is not triggered by price change but by the technology evolution. In another word, unlike the
common contexts, the uniqueness of my study is that, the physical cost of adopting the service is not
critically important in determining consumer’s decision process, especially the forward-looking
behavior. In fact, such a phenomenon is not novel in the field, especially in a fast developing hightech market. For example, like I-pad, its original launch price is always the same for all generation
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but the features keep on updating. Storage size increased exponentially from MB to GB to TB
within a few years with the price being closer between newest models. With a similar price,
consumers can always expect a better version coming in the near future.
4) Another distinct factor in our study context is non-physical cost, which we can in general
define it as “contract fee”. As we all know that The adoption decision in the B2B world is not an
easy process but associated with remarkable non-physical efforts, such as learning the technique,
training employees, cooperating multiple internal departments, negotiating with service providers
and sending budget application to top manager for approval etc.. All these non-physical efforts,
from modeling perspective, is latent to the researcher but will also influence consumer’s decision.
It is also worth mentioning that the non-physical cost is a one-time fee associated with each
contract. Each time the B2B consumers decide to adopt the service and sign contract, they will
have to spend the “contract fee”. However, once the decision is made and the contract is signed,
within the contract length, there is no additional effort of “contract fee” required. Obviously,
because of this one-time contract fee, the business consumers are not willing to frequently sign the
contract. The idea is that, if the consumers have already spent greater energy and resources to
finalize a contract, they will intend to sign a relatively longer contract to avoid another input.
5) The last is the technology keeps on updating in the market as we illustrated previously.
Moreover, once the customers make the decision of purchase, they will be bonded with the on-site
technology level at the time of purchase. Clearly, from the perspective of technology keep on
updating, the consumers should be willing to sign the contract frequently, e.g. sign a shorter
contract, because they can capture the technology evolution more effectively.
Now, we can see that there exists a decision conflict in customer’s decision process. To
save the efforts on “contract fee”, consumers tends more likely to sign longer contract. However, to
better capture technology updating, consumers should be more inclined toward shorter contract.
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Consequently, both too long and too short are not good. Customers will have to go through a
“value maximization” process to select an optimal decision for the contract length decision. In
order to quantify this “value maximization” process, we firstly need clarify consumer’s behaviors in
their decision process.
Because of the continuous technology innovation in the market, consumers will show two
kinds of behaviors in their decision process. First, customer will be bonded with the on-site
technology level once the contract is signed. This phenomenon suggests that customer’s current
decision will not only influence the current but also the future benefit associated with the purchase
decision. Consequently, customers will have to consider both current utility and discounted future
utility to make an optimal current adoption decision. To achieve this goal, consumers will have to
form future expectation on the technology evolution according to the information set that is
available to them because they are not certain about the future technology level influencing the
future potential utility. From modeling perspective, this is a typical forward looking behavior.
Second, because of the technology updating, customer will have uncertainty about the speed
of the technology evolution in their decision process. Therefore, consumers will form and update
their belief about the future technology evolution speed. We assume customers will update their
belief on future tech evolution based on the historical information. From modeling perspective, we
define this as a learning behavior. In our model, we want to quantify both behaviors.
Moreover, considering the remarkable influence of technology evolution on customer’s
behaviors, we also want to quantify the effect of tech evolution on customer decision. Learned
from the previous literature (Erdem and Keane, 1996; Ackerberg 2001 & 2003), we are able to
identify multi-dimensional effects of one attribute on consumer’s decision process in the forwardlooking dynamic model. In our study, we define that the technology evolution will create two
factors influencing consumers’ decision process:
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The first factor is the overall technology capability level which will encourage buyers to
purchase. This means that the overall technology capability level will only influence consumers’
decision of whether to buy or not. The idea is that, only if the technology level meet or exceed
customer’s needs, the adoption decision will be invoked.

The second is the speed of technology

evolution which we define as “technology evolution pace”. The technology evolution pace will
produce two effects: one is postponing customers’ adoption decision; the other is to encourage a
short term contract. This suggests that the technology evolution pace will influence consumers’
both decisions of whether or not to buy and how long to buy, e.g. contract length. The intuition is
that, if the customers consider the technology evolution to be very fast and expect a more advanced
technology to appear in the near future, then the customers may either hold their current adoption
decision to wait for the future better offer, or at most take a try on the service with a shorter
contract.
Based on the previous motivations, we are interested in the following research questions:
How can we structurally model customer’s decision process on the high-tech service adoption? In
this structural model, we want to address two issues in consumer’s decision process:
1) We want to simultaneously model consumer’s two-fold decisions at each decision time
point: whether or not to buy and how long to buy, e.g. contract length
2) We want to evaluate the impacts of technology evolution on customer’s decision.
There are several reasons that the structural model is the most appropriate modeling
approach in our study. The major modeling contributions in our study are also embedded in the
reasons.
1) The first reason is that we want to understand the underlying relationship between
customer’s decision and technology evolution; therefore, we can’t rely on the approach of putting
co-variates into modeling framework. Evidences from multiple previous studies show that,
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especially when forward-looking behavior exists, using the reduced-form model to quantify
consumer’s decision process can create biased results which can’t be completely alleviated by
adding co-variates (Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Sun et al., 2003; Sun, 2005; Melnikov 2012).
Discovering the underlying relationship between technology evolution and consumer decision
process is also the first major modeling contribution in our study.
2) We will introduce in detail in the model setup section that, we will use dynamic
programming approach to account for customer’s forward looking behavior. Specifically, we want
to integrate both consumer’s contract length decision and the technology evolution (both overall
technology and technology evolution pace) into the dynamic programming process to structurally
explain customer’s decision. In other words, we want to provide if-what answers on the impacts of
technology on customer’s decision. This is the second reason that we have to build a structural
model. The modeling approach of integrating contribution length and technology evolution into the
dynamic programming approach serves as another modeling contribution in our study.
3) The last reason is that, using structural model, we can also do the counterfactual study to
show, under different scenarios of announcing the technology evolution, how the customer’s
decision will change. Recalled that we laid out two potential problems in the market, one is how to
manage this continuous innovation and the other is how to evaluate impacts of tech evolution on
customer’s decision. The two unique contributions in our model setup will help us to solve the
potential problems.
In summary, this dissertation offers a significant contribution in two areas: 1) we specify a
model to include a consumer’s multiple decisions; and 2) we develop a model estimation procedure
that can provide insights on understanding a consumer’s decision process in the technology
evolution market by taking into account both forward-looking and learning behavior.
Insert Table 1 here
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Modeling Framework
In the conceptual framework (as shown in Figure 1), we first start with modeling a
consumer’s current utility at each decision time point. We build the consumer’s current utility as a
function of the overall technology level. The current utility addresses the relationship between the
“whether to adopt” decision and the current overall consumer technology need level has to be
reached in order to invoke his/her purchase decision.
Next, we structure the model to account for consumer’s forward looking behavior and
learning behavior, which are incited by the technology evolution. The relationship between the two
behaviors and the consumer’s current adoption decision can be illustrated in the following manner.
First, the continuous technology evolution will encourage consumers to form expectations on the
future technology updating pace. Second, being in a turbulent environment, consumers will have to
continuously learn from the existing information related to the technology evolution in order to
update their beliefs about the technology level. Therefore, both behaviors will impact the
consumers’ process of determining the future value of what they expect to receive from the evolved
technology, which in turn, will impact their current purchase decisions. The intuition is that, with a
greater technology evolution pace, consumers should expect a better value from adopting in the
future, thus either withdraw their current adoption decision or select a shorter contract to experience
various aspects of the adopted technology (ie. learn the technology and apply it to the business) and
decide whether or not continuing with it would be beneficial to the company.
Insert Figure 1 here
We propose to operationalize the conceptual framework by integrating three modeling
approaches: dynamic programming, learning process, and structural modeling paradigm. The
dynamic programming (DP) approach offers a parsimonious way to solve a sequential decision
process under uncertainty (Rust, 1994) which allows us to quantify a consumer’s forward looking
20

behavior in a joint-decision model. Different from the static choice models, the DP model suggests
that the consumer should generate an expected value including the utilities of both current and all
future decisions to evaluate alternatives. Following the methodology proposed by Rust (1994), we
will utilize the “Bellman equation” to solve the consumer’s value function. The theoretical
derivation of the “Bellman equation” takes into account several unique perspectives, which is also a
novel and representative contribution in our study.
First, considering both discrete and continuous decisions in the DP model elevates the
difficulty in both deriving and solving the “Bellman equation.” Second, quantifying a consumer’s
forward looking behaviors, in our study, requires taking into account the consumer’s learning
process. The well-documented learning model has been widely applied to capture consumer’s
beliefs updating (Erdem and Keane 1996). The traditional learning model (Erdem and Kean, 1996)
focused on updating consumer’s belief on the mean level while assuming variance of perception to
be both constant over time and known to the consumer. Moreover, the traditional learning model
considered the all information that available to the consumer over time to be equally important to
the consumers. Consequently, when time approaches infinity, consumer’s belief becomes a
constant because consumers have no uncertainty about their belief. This idea in traditional learning
model was found to be less realistic in the turbulent market especially product crisis exists (Zhao et
al., 2011). To better capture consumer’s learning behavior, Zhao et al. (2011) not only relaxed the
assumption of constant and known variance of perception, but also introduced an information
discount factor to account for the diminishing confidence over time in consumers’ belief. We will
adopt this more realistic methodology in consumer learning model to capture a consumer’s beliefs
updating on both the mean level and variance of perception (Zhao et.al 2011). Finally, deriving the
“Bellman equation” requires the specification of transition probability for state variables which are
deterministic of consumer’s expected value. Our study includes four state variables originated from
21

the consumer’s future expectation and innate learning process. Not only has the number of state
variables almost reached the upper limit in the dynamic programming model, but also the majority
of the state variables are partially latent to the researcher which adds the “Partially Observed
Markov dynamic model” to our modeling framework (Ricardo et.al 2010).
We will use a maximum likelihood function for model estimation. Both the latent
parameters, such as the non-physical effort, and the consumer heterogeneity bring in multiple layers
of integration in deriving the likelihood function. Moreover, both the Bellman equation and
Likelihood function have no close-form solution and require iteratively searching for numerical
solution until convergence. Basically, in order to empirically solve our model, we will have to do
two loops of numerical searching: one is the searching for “value function”; the other is the
searching for “value function”. The process of solving “value function” is embedded in the solution
of “likelihood function”. This means that: 1) In order to reach the optimal solution of parameter
estimations, we will have to strategically change the parameter settings and find the associated
solution of “likelihood” at any given parameter settings. 2) The solution of “value function”
depends on both state variables and the value of parameters in the model. Therefore, in order to get
the result of “likelihood” at any one set of parameter values, we will have to solve “value function”
through iteration. Therefore, these two loops of numerical searching are not parallel but two levels
of nesting. Other than the two levels of nesting, to get the answer of “likelihood”, we also need to
solve the stochastic term at a given contract decision which also depends on numeric searching
because there is no analytical solution between the stochastic term and decision variable.
It is worth mentioning that our framework is built upon the structural modeling approach.
The major advantage of structural model is that the parameter estimation is invariant to the firm
policy (Erdem and Kean 1996), which enables our model to detect a consumer’s innate sensitivity
to technology evolution.
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We will estimate our model using data from a global high-tech company who continuously
invests in developing an innovated high-tech service to its business partners since 2009.

Model Setup
Part 1 – current utility function
Consider in our study context where there is a set of consumers I = {i|i = 1, 2, ..., I} who
make decisions on purchasing the service at different time point. Therefore, consumers’ purchases
are observed over the period T = {t|t = 1, 2, ..., T}, where T is the time span of the period. Let
represents the current utility that consumers (i) receive with their decision at a given purchase
occasion (t). As we mentioned previously, in our study context, the technology of the service keep
on updating over time. Reflected in the model, we use

to represent the actual overall

technology level at a given purchase occasion (t).
In our model, we assume that the utility (

) derived by consumer (i) for whether to adopt

the high-tech service given the actual technology level

at current purchase occasion (t) can

be represented as:

Where

represents the consumer specific mean-level net-utility when the actual overall

technology level =0. This mean-level net-utility represents the difference between the consumer’s
baseline preference toward the actual overall technology level and the potential unobserved cost
associated with consumer’s need. Please note that, the mean-level net-utility

is only consumer

i-specific not a time t-specific parameter although it embraces the unobserved cost, because the
unobserved physical cost is not a t-specific item in our study. As we stated previously that the
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physical cost of the service in our context is associated with consumer’s need and has no systematic
change over time. Therefore, mean-level net-utility parameter is

not

. Moreover, we don’t

separately specify a “physical cost” function in our model setup because the “physical cost” data
has tremendous variance which blocks the valuable information that we can use to recover
parameters in our model. To avoid the identification issue, we use one consumer specific parameter
to estimate the difference between consumer’s baseline preference and the potential cost with
consumer’s need. We acknowledge this as a data limitation in our study. But this is not our model
limitation because, once more valuable “physical cost” data is available, our model can be flexibly
extended to add in another layer of “cost” function to empirically estimate the physical cost.
is the consumer specific coefficient of the actual overall technology level. It captures
customer’s utility sensitivity of the overall technology level, e.g. to what extent the change of
overall technology level will impact consumers’ current utility.
indicates the actual overall technology level at a purchase occasion (t).
is the net-utility error for consumer (i) at purchase time (t). It captured the unobserved
factors impacting consumer’s net-utility, for example the service provider may provide a short-term
promotion to incite consumer making purchases. We assume a normal distribution for the random
component

. We fix the variance term at 1, e.g.

for identification issue.

We represent the consumer utility for the outside (or no adoption/purchase) option as
e.g. set the corresponding current utility level to zero.
This utility function setup has the following properties: a) a consumer’s current utility is
only associated with the current overall technology level; b) both “utility” and the “parameters” are
consumer-specific in order to address the consumer heterogeneity. In our model setup, we assume
that although consumers possess distinct requirements for technology, each individual consumer’s
need is consistent over time. Therefore, the consumer-level
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also demonstrate the discrepancy of

needs between consumers. Each consumer (i) will make purchase decision only if the current
technology level

matches or exceeds their needs (e.g.

It is worth mentioning that, the current utility
utility. It means that, given the technology level

).

defined in our study is a “one-period”
at current purchase occasion (t), if the

consumers decide to make the purchase and sign a contract, then on each time period within the
contract length, customers will receive this utility

. This is different from the CPG goods or

durable goods that, once the customers purchase the product, they will receive an overall utility
associate with the goods. Therefore, this is not a “one-time” overall utility but a “one-period”
sequential utility.

Part 2 – Technology Evolution
As we mentioned previously that, in our study context, the technology level of the
service keep on updating, which invokes consumer’s forward looking behavior. We assume that, at
current purchase occasion (t), consumers are able to fully observe the actual overall technology
level

. However, when consumers have forward looking behavior, they will have to

consider both current utility and discounted future utilities to the current purchase occasion to make
an optimal current decision. To quantify the future utilities, we will need the future overall
technology level thus we need to define the technology evolution function.
We assume that the technology evolves in this way. The current actual overall technology
level

is a function of previous actual overall technology level

improvement of technology

Where
the same as the
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and some unobserved technology evolution

, the observed
. (Equ (2))

is the actual overall technology level at current purchase occation (t), this is
in the current utility function (Eqn (2)).

is the actual overall technology level at previous purchase occation (t-1).
is defined as the “improvement of technology” at current purchase occasion (t), it was
captured by the number of technology related official news released by the high-tech service
provider at time (t). In our context, the high-tech service provider keeps on announcing official
news to their customers. The customers can read the official news publicized on the official website
every months. We collect the data of the number of news from the official website too and use it as
the indicator of the “improvement of technology” in the technology evolution function.
is the stochastic term capturing the unobserved technology evolution. We assume a
normal distribution for the random component

.

In this modeling approach, we assume that the improvement of technology can be fully
captured by the

, e.g. the number of technology related official news released by the high-tech

service provider at current purchase occasion (t). We acknowledge that this can be a big
assumption because we may have other resources that can capture the technology improvements.
At current stage, we don’t have other effective attributes that can help us to refine the technology
evolution function. This can be another limitation of our study and suggests a direction for future
study, e.g. improve the technology evolution function. We also acknowledge that, the quality of
each individual news can be different, which means that the weight of each individual news
representing the technology improvement can be different. However, in our model, we don’t control
for such quality deviation. We introduce an error term “ ” to capture all aspects of the unobserved
technology evolution. Therefore, the estimation of

can inform us about the capability of official

released news on capturing the improvement of technology.
As we mentioned previously, in our model setup, we assume that customers can fully
observe the current technology level

. However, to form forward looking structural model,

we need the consumers to make prediction on future overall technology level. In order to do so,
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consumers will also need to predict the future technology evolution. And this requires a learning
process. Specifically, consumers firstly obtain the historical information on how much official
news were released in different months (e.g.
future improvement of technology

, then they form a belief on the

, e.g. news released speed, finally they could make a

prediction on the future overall technology level

.

Part 3 – Consumer learning on News releasing frequency
As pointed out previously that, it is a learning process that consumers form belief on the
future improvement of technology based on the historical information of how much official news
were released. And this learning process is critical for consumers to make prediction on future
overall technology level. Therefore, in this section, we will specify the consumer’s learning model
on the “improvement of technology”, e.g. the news releasing frequency

.

In the learning model, we focus on the information role of news releasing frequency on
consumer’s perceptions about the improvement of technology. We assume that consumers have
uncertainty about both the true mean level and the precision of the improvement of technology
contained in and conveyed by the news releasing frequency. Consequently, consumers will base on
the signals that they received from the news releasing frequency to form their perception on both
the mean level and precision of the improvement of technology.
Therefore, we firstly specify consumers’ learning of mean level and the precision of
“improvement of technology” after exposure to the news releasing frequency. We assume that, the
news frequency released each month provides a noisy but unbiased signal for the improvement of
technology. Specifically, We defined that consumers believe the “improvement of technology
” at time (t) following a Poisson distribution with parameter of .
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Where

represents the true mean level of the

, which is unknown to the consumers.

This equation suggests that the news released frequency provides imperfect information about the
true mean level of the

. As we all know that, the mean and variance are the same for Poisson

distribution. Therefore, the

not only represents the true mean level of the

, but also

captures the noisiness of information conveyed by the news released frequency.
Next we define that, consumers will learn this
Given the existing information set (
level of

Where

from the previous information set ( ).

, a consumer has formed a prior opinion about the true mean

, e.g. , which follows a gamma distribution:

are the parameters of the prior distribution.

In the equation (4),

is defined as consumer (i)’s existing information set at time t. Several

sources can contribute to the consumer information set
knowledge about the high-tech

: 1) The first source is consumer prior

, e.g. the prior knowledge level before observing any

official released news. The prior knowledge is an i-specific term as each consumer holds different
opinions about the high-tech. 2) The second source is the official released online news (

),

which is considered as the representative of the improvement of technology. Obviously, the news is
a t-specific term as it is released by the high-tech service provider thus the publishing cycle has no
relationship with the consumers. 3) The third source is the consumer intrinsic information process,
which demonstrates how consumers continuously evaluate on the periodically released news. Each
source will contribute to updating the consumer beliefs about the news described in the following
equations.
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After observing the actual news released at time (t), consumers begin to update their beliefs
on the true mean level of
distribution

, e.g.

through updating the two parameters of gamma

.
{

Where

}

are the parameters of the prior distribution before observing the historical

technology related news before time (t) and

are the parameters of posterior distribution of

after the consumers are exposed to the number of news released at time (t).
The idea of learning model can be summarized at follow (Figure 2):
At the beginning of time t, consumers pertain a prior opinion about the true mean level of
, which follows a gamma distribution with parameters of

. The true mea level of

is represented by .
During time t, the consumers receive a new information set of

e.g. they are exposed

to a new set of official released news. According to customers belief, the number of the newly
released official news

should follow a poisson distribution with the parameter of .

Combine the prior opinion and the new information set, the consumers form the posterior
belief about the , which follow a gamma distribution with the parameter of

.

Insert Figure 2

Finally, we consider that consumer will always place a higher weight on the more recently
perceived information. We want to integrate the fact that consumer’s confidence about their belief
can gradually decrease by time into our model setup. To do so, we posit that consumers recall their
prior evaluation on the technology related news with noise. In the model set up, we introduce the
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information discount factor in customer’s learning. This modeling idea is originated from
information processing theory in psychological study and was firstly introduced in learning model
by Zhao et al. (2011).
The idea of information discount factor can be described more visually as follow. For
example, we can posit ourselves as the decision makers of whether to adopt the high-tech service or
not. We continuously learn from the official information that is available to us. Suppose that, we
have only two information in hand, one information was a one-year old information and the other
one was a new information publicized yesterday. What we need to do is to derive today’s actual
overall technology level to aid our decision making. The question is which information we should
give more weight and which information we should give less weight when making the judgment?
From a common and realistic perspective and in a rational consumer’s decision process, the recent
information should receive more weight, and older information is discounted. This is the concept of
information discount.
Reflected in our model (Equation 6), we capture such noise in the information updating
model by keeping the mean level of the news perception constant and allow the variances to
increase over time (Zhao et.al 2011).
{

Where

}

is the parameter that accounts for the information discount process and takes the

value between 0 and 1. If

, it suggests that there is no information discount, e.g. consumers

treat all period information equally important in their decision process.
This setting ensures that the information discount process only impacts the variance of news
perception while keeping the mean level constant, as shown in Equation (7):
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Figure 3 visually displays the difference in the belief formation process between including
the information discount factor

and without the . From the plot, we can straightforwardly

explain why we introduce the information discount factor in our study. On the plot, the X-axis
represents the purchase occasion time (t) and the Y-axis represents the consumer’s belief on the true
mean level of

, e.g. the consumer’s belief on . It is worth mentioning that, the phenomena

shown in the graph happens at infinity time condition, e.g.

.

In the consumers’ traditional learning process, as t approach infinity, consumers’ belief gets
close to a constant level regardless of the new coming information set. The reason is that, as t
approach infinity, the two parameters of , e.g. both
Consequently, the variance of

, e.g.

information set. The variance of

and , approach infinity at the same rate.

, will approach zero regardless of the future

approaching zero means that consumer’s uncertainty about their

belief will approach zero, which is equivalent to that the consumer’s belief on

becomes constant

regardless of any newly released information set in the future. The underlying idea of the
traditional learning process is that, when time is long enough and all the historical information were
treated equally important, the consumers have already observed enough information to form their
belief on , thus they have absolute confidence about their belief, e.g. have no uncertainty about .
As a result, the new coming information will not alter consumers’ evaluations about . Shown in the
Figure 3, the expectation of , e.g.

, becomes a straight line.

However, when we introduce the “information discount” of , consumers’ uncertainty will
never approach zero. Consequently, whenever new information set shows up, consumer’s belief,
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both mean level and uncertainty will be affected. The idea of learning process with information
discount factor is that, with the information discount of , the historical information is no longer
functional thus consumers’ uncertainty will never become zero. Whenever new information are
released, consumer’s evaluation will be influenced. Shown in the Figure 3, consumer’s expectation
of , e.g.

, is always related to the most recent information.

Clearly, the learning process with the discount factor of

should match better with the

actual consumer’s learning process (Zhao et al., 2011). In order to make our assumption more
realistic, we assume the information discount exists. But our model is very flexible because we
allow the discount factor to vary between 0 and 1. Our estimation will tell us whether the discount
equals 1 or not. If it equals 1, this means that there is no discount, e.g. consumers treat all historical
information equally important in their learning process. Clearly, the smaller the discount factor is,
the heavier the historical information will be discounted.
Insert Figure 3 here

Part 4 – Consumer Dynamic Optimization on the Contract Length
So far, we have already defined the consumer’s current utility function (Equation (1));
technology evolution function (Equation (2)); and consumer’s learning model (Equation (3) ~ (7)).
Recalled that, the reason of we develop technology evolution function and consumer learning model
is because consumers have forward looking behavior in their decision process. We emphasized
again that, in our model setup, we assume that customers can fully observe the current technology
level

. However, to form forward looking structural model, we need the consumers to make

prediction on future overall technology level

because they have to consider both

current utility and discounted all future utilities to optimize the current decisions: whether to buy
and how long to buy (contract length). That is why we need the technology evolution function.
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Moreover, in order to make prediction on the future overall technology level, consumers will need
to form belief on the future technology evolution, e.g. the future “improvement of technology”
. And this is the reason we define learning model. Based on all the model setup from
part 1 to part 3, we now can develop the consumer dynamic decision model to account for the
forward looking behavior.
We model the consumers’ decisions of whether to adopt the high-tech service and how long
to sign a specific length of contract

as a dynamic programming process. The objective of the

consumer is to make a sequential decision in each of the T discrete period where T is infinite. This
corresponds to the method of using infinite-horizon dynamic programming to solve consumer’s
markov decision process (Rust, 1994). Basically, the optimal decisions of whether to buy and how
long to buy for each consumer (i) at any purchase occasion (t) is the solution to the following
problem:

{

}

{∑ [ ∑ (

(

))

]}

With the constrain of

Where
a contract length of

indicates that consumer (i) make the kth adoption decision at time
.
is the “current net-utility” that consumer (i) possessed from making the kth

adoption decision at purchase occasion
(

) is defined as follow:
(

33

)

. For consumer (i), as shown in Equation (1),

with

Both Equation (1) and (9) define the consumer’s current utility associated with the current
decision. The only difference is that: Equation (1) in general defines the current net-utility at any
given purchase occasion (t); while Equation (9) specifically indicates the current net-utility at any
kth adoption decision occasion ( ). Therefore, we use

in Equation (9) instead of

.

is the utility discount factor, which is used to discount all the future utilities to
the current purchase occasion.
is the customer (i)-specific unobserved non-physical cost associated with signing a
contract.

is the short-term for “efforts of signing a new contract”. As we described previously,

the non-physical cost is a unique feature in the B2B world and can include searching cost, learning
the technique, training employees, cooperating multiple internal departments, negotiating with
service providers and sending budget application to top manager for approval etc. Considering that
consumer’s resources input on signing a new contract can be diversified because the consumer’s
needs are unique, we assume that the unobserved non-physical cost

will follow a normal

̅̅̅̅

distribution, e.g.

Equation (8) fully describes how we account for consumer’s dynamic decision property, e.g.
forward-looking behavior in our modeling approach. The modeling idea behind the Equation (8) is
described as follow:
First, in this equation, we define that consumer’s decision time span is from 0 to infinity
because consumers need to consider a long-term decision. Within this decision time span,
consumers can sign infinity number of contracts. As shown previously, we use the
contract index indicating each individual contracts from 1 to
consumer and

tells the contract length.

point of the kth contract.
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. Obviously,

as the

indicates each

, being more specific, is defined as the starting

Next, each contract can bring customer an overall value, which is represented by the
expression within the bracket, e.g. [∑
expression, the

(

(

))

] in Equation (8). In this

, as stated before, is the current net-utility of consumer (i) making the kth

adoption decision at decision time, also the contract starting point of

. It is worth mentioning

again that this net utility is a “one-period” utility, which means, within the contract, at each time
period from
∑

to

(

, consumer will receive this same net-utility. The expression of
(

)) in the bracket is called the “discounted cumulative utility”, which

means that, we discount all the periodically future utility (e.g.
to the current decision time

.

) within the contract length

is the utility discount factor and

unobserved non-physical cost. We mention again that

is the

is a one-time fee associated with each

individual contract.
Finally, in order to understand customer’s decision, we will have to maximize the long-term
value that consumers obtained from signing each individual contract from 1 to infinity, e.g. the
expression of

{∑

[∑

see the mathematical notation of

(

(

))

]} in the Equation (8). That is why we

at the beginning of Equation (8). It has to be pointed out

that maximizing this value is a very complicated process because customers have to consider all
future possibility of decisions in order to optimize the current decision. Moreover, since we don’t
know the future technology level

at any given decision occasion

, we have to

compute the expectation of the value, which is the reason that we see the mathematical notation of
representing expectation at the beginning of the expression.
To illustrate this value function better, we draw a graph (Figure 4) to visually explain the
modeling idea. In Figure 4, let’s assume that consumer (i) decides to adopt the high-tech service at
decision time of
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and sign a contract of

. Then within the contract length of

, like

we said before that, on each time point from
same net-utility of

to

, this consumer will receive the

as the net-utility at the decision time

(

) because consumer

will be bonded with the on-site overall technology level once the contract is signed. In the B2B
world, since the consumers will have to spend effort on signing each contract, we assume that
consumers will try to solve their problems in one holistic decision thus will not make any new hightech service purchase within the signed contract duration. And there is little change that consumers
will break the contract, especially in the B2B world, due to the remarkable resources they have
already spent on signing the contract and the potential penalty of breaking an existing contract.
This suggests that once the consumers make the adoption decision at time
decision time is
When the contract of

, the next available

.
ends, consumers can continue to make decision on whether to

adopt again or not. At each decision occasion after

, the decision can be either yes or

no. In order to make the optimal decision at each decision occasion, the consumer will have to
consider all the future decision possibilities and discount the potential utilities to the current
decision occasion. This dynamic decision process will move on to the infinity decision occasion
and infinity number of contract length decision

. That is why it is called “infinite-

horizon dynamic programming”. It doesn’t matter whether or not there is a time gap between
consecutive decisions.
Insert Figure 4

It has to be pointed out that, in our dynamic model setup, decision variable
“continuous decision” not a “discrete choice”. When
decision”. When
the consumer. Ideally,
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, the actual number of

is a

, it indicates “no adoption
indicates the contract length signed by

can be any number between 0 and infinity. This is a key difference

between our proposed dynamic decision model and the standard dynamic decision model in the
existing studies from consumer’s perspective. Introducing the continuous decision in the dynamic
decision model makes the derivation process of value function (described in part 5 below)
becoming a contribution in the paper because the solution of the Bellman Equation (described in
part 5 below) is significantly different from that in discrete dynamic decision model.

Part 5 – Derive Bellman Equation (Value Function)
As we described previously, to solve the optimal decision shown in Equation (8), we need to
derive the bellman optimality equation. The fundamental idea of Bellman Equation, which was part
of the dynamic programming theory, was invented by Bellman (1954, 1956) in applied mathematics
studies, and later was introduced into economics field to solve discrete Markov decision process
(Rust, 1994; Puterman, 1990).
When we use dynamic programming theory to solve discrete Markov decision process, we
firstly need to be clear about the major components in the Markov decision process (Rust, 1994).
The components, which are also the foundation for developing Bellman Equation, include:
1) The time variable

; the time variable corresponds to the decision occasion in the

market, and
2) State variables ̃ ; the state variables determine the outcomes of value function. Once
we specify the value of state variables, we know the outcomes of value function.
3) Decision variable(s) ̃ : the decision variables indicate consumers’ decision at each
decision occasion. In discrete Markov decision process, the decision variables can be either
whether to buy the product or not, such as Song & Chintagunta’s study (2003), or the choice
between alternative brands, such as Erdem et al.’s study (2003). In our study, the decision variable
is consumer’s “contract length” decision, which is a continuous variable.
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4) The transition probabilities for all state variables ̃ ̃

̃ ̃ : the transition

probability is used to identify the conditional expectation of the utility over all future decision
occasions. As we mentioned previously that, the essence of using dynamic structural approach to
model consumer’s forward looking behaviors is: in order to optimize a current purchase decision,
consumers need to combine both current utility at the decision occasion and all future discounted
utilities. When consumers evaluate the all future utilities, they don’t know the corresponding level
of the state variables. Therefore, we will have to take the expectation thus require the transition
probability.
Following the theory defined in dynamic programming, we derive the Bellman Equation,
e.g. the value function. The definition of “value function” is very similar as the “utility function”.
Defining “value function” in dynamic model, from the modeling idea perspective, is equivalent to
defining “utility function” in static model. The only difference is that, the utility function refers to
the current utility that consumers received from the static decision at current decision occasion;
while the value function indicates the expected discounted summation of all utilities (both current
and future) that consumers received from their dynamic decision under forward-looking behaviors.
Next, we derive the value function specifically for our study as follow:
(̃ )

{∑

Where

(̃

)

∫

̃

(̃

( ̃ ) is the value received by consumer

set of states ̃ . The

(̃

|̃

)

at a decision occasion

}

with a given

( ̃ ) is an “optimal” value, which means that, if the consumer

optimal contract length decision at decision occasion
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)

make an

with a given set of states ̃ , s/he should

receive a value of

( ̃ ) which is the best value comparing with all other possible contract length

decisions. This is the reason that we have

at the beginning of the right side of the equation.

̃ represents the current state variables that consumer

face at the current decision

. In our model, the state variables include: ̃

occasion

is the actual overall technology level;

. Recalled that,

are the parameters in consumer learning model

determining consumer’s perception on the true mean level of news released frequency;

is the

error component in the current utility function (Equation (1)) which is assumed to follow a normal
distribution.
̃

represents the transition states, meaning the states at the beginning of next

available decision occasion, e.g. (

), e.g. after the current chosen contract duration ends.

The state variables include: ̃

.

To better understand the value function, we need to view it in two parts:
(̃

1) The first part is the expression of ∑
discounted utilities that consumer
made at the decision occasion
each time period, consumer

), which represents the cumulative

received from the contract length decision

that s/he

with a given set of state ̃ . Within the contract length
received the same utility as the one at the decision time

, at

,

therefore, we are able to compute the exact value of the cumulative discounted utilities within the
contract length.
2) The second part is the expression of

∫

(̃

)

(̃

|̃

which represents the discounted expected value of the all future utilities after the contract length
ends. Consumers should face the new set of states ( ̃
at decision occasion
(̃
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) when the contract length

ends, consequently, the value of the all future utilities should be

). Because we don’t observe the actual value of the future new states ̃

when

),

consumers are trying to optimize the decision at current occasion (t), we need to take the
expectation, e.g. integrate the new states out in the expression, thus need the transition probability
of

(̃

|̃

).

It is worth mentioning that, the derivation of the Bellman Equation is based on the
assumption of stationary Markov decision process, meaning that, consumer’s decision rule is
consistent at each decision occasion

(Rust, 1994). That is the reason that we see the value

function only depends on the state variable but not depends on the decision occasion

.

Part 6 – Likelihood Function
After we specify the value function (Equation (10)) to quantify consumer’s decision process,
the next step is to empirically estimate the model, which requires the likelihood function.
In our model setup, we can categorize the parameters into four groups: 1) the parameters in
the utility function:

; 2) the parameters in the technology evolution function:

parameters in the consumer learning model:

; where

of the

. Please note that, since the

; and 4) efforts of signing the contract:

; 3) the

represents the initial value
are

consumer-specific parameters, therefore, the ultimate parameters estimated by the MLE become
̅

̅

̅̅̅̅

.

Next, we need to derive the probability distribution of decision variable

given all the

parameters. This requires us to know the expression of stochastic terms as a function of the
decision variable

, which requires the value function we defined before (Equation (10)).

According to the value function (Equation (10)), we know that
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To show the expression more obviously, here we use “

” to represent the value function.

Based on our model setup of technology evolution function (Equation (2)) and consumer
learning model (Equation (5) & (6)), we have the following functional forms:

Similarly, we use the “

” to represent the function of technology evolution

and the two parameters in learning model respectively.
Combine equation (11) and equation (12), we have:

As shown in Equation (13), we have two sets of stochastic terms in our model: one is
other include

. To simplify the expression and the estimation process of our likelihood

function, we want to derive the relationship between decision variable
so, we denote the contract length
stochastic term of

; the

as a function of

and

only. To do

conditional on both the parameters and

, e.g.
̃{

}

Where ̃ represents the set of all parameters, e.g. ̃
Please note that the {

{

}

} are not parameters but the “news frequency per month” and

“decision time” in our data. The Equation (14) suggests that, we don’t treat

as stochastic

term but as time-specific parameters in our likelihood function.
Based on the assumption of
density function of observed data
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and

, we can write the conditional

by using the Change-of-Variable theorem:

̃

(

̃{

(

} )) ‖

‖

Next, what we need to do is integrating out all the heterogeneity terms and the unobserved
terms including

. Finally, we could derive the Likelihood function

as:
( ̃ |{

}{

Where ̃

} )

(

∮̃

{ ̅

̅

(

̃{

̅̅̅̅

})) ‖

̅̅̅

̃ ̃ ̃

‖

̅̅̅

}

Obviously that, in order to find the Likelihood for parameter estimation, we need the
function of

, which is actually the

still don’t have the close-form solution for
following items: 1) Given a

function in Equation (15) and (16). Since we
, we will need to empirically compute the

, find the corresponding

; and 2) the ‖

‖ by

iteration.
We can draw a diagram to visually show the logical link between the six parts of the model
setup (Figure 5). Basically, when consumers optimize their dynamic decisions, they will consider
two parts of the benefits associated with the current decision: One is the current utility of the
decision, e.g. the utility function we established in Part 1; the other is the future utilities of
decisions. In static model, consumers only have to consider the first part of the benefit. The
second part of benefits, which involves the evaluation of future utilities of current decision, is the
major difference from the static model and is the major reason why we call it forward-looking
dynamic model.
Consumers don’t know the future states to quantify the future utilities thus they will have to
form expectation on the future states. Reflected in our model, we need to build the technology
evolution function in Part 2 and the learning model in Part 3 to understand how consumers form
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their expectation on the future states. Finally, we put both current utility and future utilities together
to understand consumers’ dynamic decision optimization process, which lead to the dynamic model
in Part 4. Next, to solve the maximization process in the dynamic model, we utilize the bellman
equation to derive the Value Function shown in Part 5. And to estimate our model, we need to
derive the Likelihood function discussed in Part 6.
Insert Figure 5 here

Model Estimation
We estimate the model parameters using a “Maximum Likelihood Estimation” approach.
Specifically, we use the “Simplex Method” to identify the optimal parameter estimation result
(Nelder and Mead, 1965). The detailed steps of performing “Simplex Method” are described in
Appendix C. As we mentioned previously in Modeling Framework section, our model estimation
process includes two loops of numerical searching, e.g. the simulation of “value function” and the
searching for maximum likelihood function. We described the detailed steps of value function
simulation in Appendix A. Moreover, in order to compute the likelihood function, we also need to
find the at a given contract decision of

and solve the Jacobian of ‖

‖, whose

detailed steps are described in Appendix B and D respectively. We can draw a diagram to visually
show the estimation process (Figure 6) and summarize the detail steps as follow:
Step 1: At a given set of parameters and pre-defined boundary and grids of state variables,
we can compute the corresponding value function (Appendix C)
Step 2: Combined the simulated value function and the actual data of purchase time,
contract length and news frequencies; we can calculate the likelihood function for the given set of
parameters. Here we need to utilize Appendix A, B and D to identify the result of likelihood.
Step 3: We integrate the likelihood computation into Simplex Process to find the optimal
parameter estimation, e.g. the set of parameters corresponding to maximum likelihood. If the
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results pass the searching criteria of Simplex Process, then we stop and report the results; otherwise,
we go back to step 1 and do the computation again.
Insert Figure 6 Here

Data Description
Our data comes from a global leading high-tech company (service provider). Its products
include almost all kinds of high-tech products and infrastructures, such as hardware, software, and
personal computers, and covers both B2B and B2C settings. From 2007, they began to build a cloud
service for their B2B consumers.
In total our data includes 218 business-to-business buyers. All of them have had at least one
historical purchase with the service provider before purchasing the hi-tech service. The
characteristic suggests that the 218 buyers should consider the service provider in our study as the
first choice over other competitors when adopting the high-tech service, not only because the
service provider holds the superior power in the market, but also because the buyers are existing
B2B consumers who retain better knowledge about having a relationship with the service provider.
Our data includes both the service transaction and the official news items. Both data were
collected at the monthly level. The time frame of service transaction data ranges from January. 2009
to September 2011 and the data include both consumer adoption decision time (year & month) and
the decision of contract length (in unit of months). The official news-count data time-frame ranges
from October 2008 to January 2012 and the data were recorded as number of news items per month.
We present both a graphical illustration and summary statistics of consumer’s contract
length decision and officially released news-counts in Figure 7. On average, consumers purchase
the service for 14.5 months, which is slightly longer than one year, but the range can cover from 1
month to 60 month, e.g. 5 years (Figure 7, left table). Additionally, the average number of official
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news-counts that the service provider released every month is 3.95, with the minimum of 1 and
maximum of 11 (Figure 7, right table). Moreover, the patterns of the contract length and the newscounts (Figure 7) suggest that, in general when the news-count is high, the contract length tends to
be low. Recall that news-count is used to capture the improvement of technology. We previously
mentioned that when consumers consider the tech evolution to be fast, they may either postpone
their adoption decision or take a try with a shorter contract; our data pattern shows that the concept
is empirically true.
Insert Figure 7 here

Structure of Value Function
Before illustrating the model estimation results and policy simulation, it is worth showing
the structure of the value function because the essence of using the dynamic programming approach
to model consumer’s forward looking behavior is the construction of value function for capturing
consumer’s decision process. Since our primary interest is to explore the underlying relationship
between technology evolution and consumer’s decision process, we will illustrate the pattern of
consumer’s value as a function of contract length and the two drivers of technology evolution, e.g.
the overall technology level and technology evolution pace.
Please note that the “value” we compute and plot on Figure 8 and Figure 9 is the ( ̃
(Equation (A2)) thus it is a function of both state variable ̃ and the decision variable
Since the state variable ̃ , after simplification (Appendix A), includes (
relationship between ( ̃
compute the ( ̃

) and

at different states of

) at fix value of

and

)
.

). To show the
respectively, we

.

Figure 8 shows the pattern of value function as a function of both contract length and the
overall technology level, e.g.
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. When overall the technology level is low (Figure 8, left

panel), the shape of consumer’s value indicates an optimal contract length at

. This

suggests that, when technology level is very low, consumers don’t think about making a purchase.
When the overall technology level is higher (Figure 8, right panel), the optimal contract length is
greater than zero, meaning consumers purchase the service. The relationship between the
consumer’s decision and the overall technology level implies that, only if the overall technology
level elevates to exceed the consumer’s need, then the consumer will consider making the purchase.
Insert Figure 8 here
Next we will show that, how the pattern of value functions as a function of both contract
length and the technology evolution pace, e.g.

(Figure 9). From the Figure 9 – Panel 1, we can

see that when the technology evolution speed is low, the shape of consumer’s value indicates that
the optimal contract length decision appears at very high

value. This suggests that, when

technology evolution pace is low, if the buyer decides to buy, they are more likely to buy with a
longer contract because they may not expect a significant technology improvement to happen in the
near future. The comparison of the 4 panels in Figure 9 shows a clear relationship between
technology evolution pace and consumer’s contract length decision, e.g. consumer’s contract length
decreases as the technology evolution pace increases. The relationship matches with our prior
expectation that, consumers will tend to have a try on approach the cloud service when expecting a
fast technology innovation pace.
Insert Figure 9 here

Simulation
In this section, we demonstrate the ability of our model to recover parameters and ensure
empirical identification. Our simulation scheme is as follow: First, we simulate the news frequency
data, based on a Possion distribution,
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and we generate the news frequency for 36 time

periods. Then, we simulate the two random error term:
can compute the

. Now we

using the technology evolution function (Equation (2)). Next, we simulate

the purchasing behavior of 200 individual consumers. Then reasons that we select 36 time periods
and 200 individuals are: first, they match with our actual data size; second, the simulation and
estimation process take heavy computation burden. Therefore, to both satisfy the requirements of
simulation and reduce the computation burden, we select the 36 time periods and 200 individuals.
In order to simulate consumer’s purchasing behavior, it is obvious that we need the value function.
First, we generate the three heterogeneous terms:
̅̅̅̅

(̅

)

(̅

) and

. Then combine both the heterogeneous parameters of

parameters of

, we can generate the value function

and the fix

( ̃ ) (Appendix A). Based on the

computed value function, we can decide both the timing of purchase and the length of contract for
each consumer at each purchase occasion. Please note that, we only consider parameters of
{̅

̅

̅̅̅̅

} and in our simulation process with the following reasons:

1) Since is the random error in current utility function (Equation (1)) which determines
consumer’s decision of whether to buy or not, e.g. binary decisions. It is acknowledged that in
choice model, the variance of error term is not identifiable. Therefore, we fix

for

identification issue.
2) Also, we fix the both the initial parameter of belief updating, e.g.

for two

reasons. First, the cloud service is a novel technology in the market thus it is reasonable to assume
that consumers don’t possess knowledge about the specification of the technology at the beginning
time. Second, from our empirical findings, the absolute values of these two initial parameters don’t
contribute significantly to the parameter estimation but add a computation burden. Therefore, we
fix
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at zero for all consumers.

As shown in Table 2, all the parameters are reasonably estimated. This result suggests that
we are able to reasonably identify and recover the parameters.
Insert Table 2 Here

Model Comparison and Validation
We compare our model with the static models (OLS and Tobit) for model comparison and
validation. In the Tobit model, we use both the news frequency and the cumulative news-count as
the independent variables. The model fit statistics are shown in Table 3. The Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) result shows that our proposed model outperforms both OLS and Tobit model in
quantifying consumer’s purchasing decision. The superiority of our model over the static model
suggests the importance of including consumer’s forward-looking behavior in understanding
consumer’s dynamic purchase behaviors. We will focus on discussing the full model specification
in the next section.
Insert Table 3 Here

Empirical Results and Discussion
In this section, we first discuss some of the estimation results of the proposed model and
explain the meaning of the estimation results. Based on the parameter estimation results, we will
show how consumer’s value is shaped and how the consumers’ contract length decision will change
as a function of the focal state variables (Equation (10)). Then we will illustrate the policy
simulation outcomes and propose the associated managerial implication.
Parameter Estimation
The parameter estimation appears in Table 4. Standard error of the estimation suggests that
all estimated parameters are significant at the 95% significance level. We take into account the
consumer heterogeneity for three parameters in the model, e.g.
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which is the mean-level net-

utility;

, which is the coefficient of technology in the utility function (Equation (1)), and

,

which is the parameter to capture the efforts of signing a contract. Therefore, their parameter
estimations include both mean-level and standard deviation. Also, we ignore the estimation of the
two initial parameters

and fix them at zero for all consumers with the reason described

previously in simulation section.
Insert Table 4 here
From Table 4, we can see that, ̅ is estimated to be negative. Recall that

indicates the

mean-level net-utility when the actual overall technology level =0 and represents the difference
between the consumer’s baseline preference toward the actual overall technology level and the
potential unobserved cost associated with consumer’s need. A negative ̅ suggests that, on
average, consumer’s baseline preference toward the technology can’t outperform the cost of the
technology thus is not strong enough to incite a purchase.
Next, we can see that, the ̅ is a positive number suggesting that, on average, consumer’s
utility should increase as the overall technology level increase, which make sense in the real world.
And we observe that the estimated absolute value of ̅ appears to be small, but the resulting
contribution of technology on the net-utility is remarkable. We can use some rough calculation to
show. In our data, if we only compute the overall technology level by the summation of news in
each month, e.g. we assume the unobserved part of

in Equation (2); within our data time

frame (e.g. from Jan. 2009.1 to Sep. 2011), we can reach an approximate result of overall
technology from 3 to 147. Then, using Equation (1), we can compute the impact of the overall
technology level on the consumer’s net-utility, which is from 0.0417 to 2.0433. Since we fix the
variance of the net-utility error

due to the identification issue, we can see that given the

parameter estimation of ̅ , the contribution of the overall technology level on consumer’s netutility is significant.
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is the information discount factor, which is used to capture the process of consumer
retrieving information. As we mentioned previously that, information processing theory suggests
that consumers put more weight on the more recent information. The estimated information
discount is 0.829 suggesting a relatively heavy information discount. It is worth mentioning again
that, the smaller the value of information discount is, the less weight that historical information will
stay in consumer’s mind when consumers making prediction on future technology level. With a
discount factor of 0.829, more than two-year old information is no longer considered in consumer’s
evaluation of future technology level. This also suggests that, consumers may concentrate more on
the most recent information on evaluating the technology evolution.
The

is the standard deviation term for the random error in technology evolution function

(Equation (2)). It is used to capture all the unobserved impacts on technology level other than the
news-count. According to the estimation result, the estimated

1.2764 suggests a relatively

large variance. This result implies that the news-count is not able to fully capture the technology
improvement thus there some errors exist in the technology evolution setting.

Value Function under Parameter Estimation Results
Based on the estimated parameters, we can compute the value function specifically for our
study. Figure 10 shows the 3D plot between the cloud adopter’s value and the two focal state
variables of the technology evolution pace and the overall technology level, represented by
respectively. The
Figure 10 is the

and

state variable has been integrated out. Therefore, the “value” we plot in

( ̃ ), which is independent of the decision variable

.

The 3D value function (Figure 10) shows that, the increase of both overall technology and
technology evolution will increase the consumer’s value. In the reality, consumers should benefit
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from evolutions in technology. Therefore, the value function result matches with the real world
situation in that consumers gain value from both overall technology elevation and increases in the
speed of innovation .
Insert Figure 10 here

Relationship between Contract Length Decision and Technology Evolution
Figure 11 is a 3D plot showing the relationship between the optimal contract length decision
and the two focal state variables of
variable of

and

. The optimal contract length is the “decision”

in the value function (Equation (10)). Since optimal contract length (CL) is a
, in order to show how consumer’s optimal contract

function of all state variables of

length decision changes by the two focal variables of
length shown in Figure 11 at

, we calculate the optimal contract

.

We find several observations from Figure 11. First, from the direction of “overall
technology”, we can see that the “optimal contract length” stays at “zero” until the “overall
technology” reach a certain level. This finding suggests that, only if the overall technology level,
e.g.

, beyond consumer’s need, the purchase decision will be invoked. Second, from the

direction of “technology evolution pace”, we can see that the “optimal contract length” shows a
clear downhill shape. This observation indicates that, the contract length decision is impacted by
the technology evolution pace, e.g.

and the relationship is clearly negative; e.g. the optimal

contract length decreases as technology evolution becomes faster. Third, still from the direction of
“technology evolution pace”, we observe that, when “technology evolution pace” increase to a
certain level, the shape of “optimal contract length” shows a clear “indentation” toward larger
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“overall technology level”. The phenomenon tells that, when the pace of technology evolution
increases to a certain level, the consumer’s purchase decision is also delayed.
In summary, the results shown in Figure 11 suggest that, our model supports our previous
assumption of: when technology evolution is fast, consumers will expect a better technology to
show in the near future thus they may either postpone their purchase decision or sign a shorter
contract to try the new technology.
Insert Figure 11 here

Policy Simulation
Given the parameter estimation results, we will conduct two settings of policy simulation.
The first setting is that we will compare consumer’s adoption decisions at two different paces of
technology evolution. The first is that the technology evolution happens more frequently but each
step of evolution is relatively smaller, which is defined as “jogging pace” evolution. The “jogging
pace” evolution is represented by an evenly distributed news-count per month. The second is that
the evolution happens less frequently but each step of evolution is relatively larger, which is defined
as “leaping pace” evolution. The “leaping pace” is represented by a large amount of news released
simultaneously in one month, and then no news for several months. To make the two paces of
evolution comparable, we will keep the total news-count released constant. The second setting is
that we will compare the consumer’s adoption decisions at two different levels of the “effort of
signing a contract”: benchmark efforts vs. half of the benchmark efforts.
The reason of selecting the two settings is that, both settings can be linked with service
provider’s strategic decision-making, meaning that the service provider, at least to some degree, can
adjust the levels of the two settings. As we all know that in hi-tech market, both releasing new
technology and update existing tech are very strategic. It is a very common phenomenon in hi-tech
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market that firms may research and develop a new tech this year, but release it 5 years later. The
results of our first setting policy simulation can aid firms in strategically managing the evolution in
their technology. Although the efforts of signing a contract is majorly under the control of businessto-business consumers, service providers can still implement some plans to partially alter it. For
example, the service provider could proactively offer to help reduce their consumers’ efforts in
signing the contract, such as help the consumers train their internal IT employees. On the other
hand, the service provider could increase the effort involved in signing a contract by acting less
friendly toward the consumer. Therefore, both of the two settings of policy simulation can provide
valuable strategic implications.
The policy simulation of the first setting shows the following results. First, comparing the
“optimal decision time” between the two paces of evolution (Figure 12), we find that the jogging
pace has “longer” decision time. Specifically, from jogging pace to leaping pace, we see a 54.18%
drop in the optimal decision time. It is worth mentioning that, the “longer” decision time indicates a
“later” purchase decision thus actually suggests a “smaller” purchase probability. The comparison
of optimal decision time between the jogging and leaping evolution paces suggests that, when
facing more frequent but smaller steps in technology evolution, consumer’s purchase probability
tends to be low, meaning consumers are less interested in making the purchase. On the contrary,
although less frequent, the larger step evolution in the leaping pace can create a stronger incitement
on consumer’s purchase decisions, e.g. consumers are more likely to make purchase. Therefore,
from the perspective of optimal decision time, the leaping pace is better than the jogging pace
because consumers show higher purchase intention (probability).
Next, comparing the “optimal contract length” between the two paces of evolution (Figure
13), we find that the jogging pace has “longer” contract length. Specifically, from the jogging pace
to leaping pace, we observe a 16.93% drop in the optimal contract length decision. Intuitively, a
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longer contract length should give higher profitability. Therefore, from the perspective of contract
length decision, the jogging pace is better than the leaping pace because consumers tend more likely
to give long-term profits. In summary, the result of the first setting policy simulation (Figure 12 and
13) tells us that, when facing more frequent but smaller steps in evolution, although the purchase
probability is relatively low, once the consumer makes the purchase decision, they tend to sign a
longer contract. On the contrary, although the larger step in evolution tends to incite consumers to
make purchases, consumers are less likely to sign a profitable contract.
Insert Figure 12 and 13 here

The policy simulation of the second setting also shows very interesting results. First, we find
a 14.02% drop in the optimal decision time when the efforts of signing contract reduce 50% (Figure
14). As we mentioned previously that a “longer” decision time suggests a “lower” purchase
probability, while a “shorter” decision time suggests a “higher” purchase probability. The finding
indicates that, when the efforts of signing a contract are reduced, consumers should be more willing
to make a purchase, which makes sense in the actual world. Therefore, from the perspective of
optimal decision time, lower effort involved in signing a contract is better because consumers are
more likely to make purchase.
Next, we observe a 9.71% drop in the optimal contract length decision when the efforts of
signing a contract is reduced 50% (Figure 15). Considering that a longer contract is more profitable,
from the perspective of contract length decision, a higher effort of signing a contract is better
because consumers are more likely to give higher profits. This finding maybe contradicts to some
common sense because we may easily think why consumers should even make the purchase if the
efforts of signing a contract are high? It need to be clarified that, the case of “how long consumers
will sign the contract” that we discuss here is conditional on “consumers make the purchase
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decision”. The underlying idea behind our result here is that, when consumers decide to purchase
and they have already spend great efforts on finalizing the contract, they are more likely to sign a
longer contract to avoid another input; which make perfect sign in B2B world.
In summary, the result of the second setting policy simulation (Figure 14 and 15) reminds us
that, although lowering the efforts of signing a contract tends to positively stimulate a consumer’s
purchase decisions, the firm may not reach desirable profitability because consumers tend to sign a
shorter contract in order to better capture future technology evolutions. On the other hand,
consumers are more reluctant to make the purchase when facing relatively higher efforts of signing
a contract; however, once they make the purchase decision, they tends more likely to sign a
profitable contract.
Insert Figure 14 and 15 here

Managerial Implication
Our study contributes substantively in two ways. First, our model demonstrate that it is
important to consider both consumer heterogeneity and forward-looking in consumer’s decision
process especially in the rapidly developed high-tech market. Both researchers and managers
should recognize that the necessary to account for forward-looking behavior in modeling
consumer’s purchase decision. Moreover, based upon our model estimation results, we can
improve a firm’s understanding on consumer’s behaviors in the turbulent market. For example, the
parameter estimations of ̅ and ̅ tell us that, although at baseline condition (e.g. technology
level =0), consumer’s preference is not strong enough to suppress the cost, consumers’ sensitivity
toward the technology improvement is still remarkable. The negative mean-level net-utility may
reflect the properties of the emerging technology which consumers don’t want to take the risk of
being the first adopters, especially in B2B world. But, managers should be confident on the impacts
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of technology improvement thus be consistent in the innovation to attract consumer’s purchase
intention. Furthermore, the estimation of information discount factor

tells us that, when

evaluating the technology evolution, consumers are far from treating all available information
equally but place relatively more weight on the more recent information. This suggests that
managers can strategically alter consumer’s decision process by altering the way of how to
publicize the information.
Second, based on our policy simulation findings, firms can know what strategy will be the
better choice under different scenarios. Moreover, to be more specific on how the result can aid
firm’s decision making, we draw a managerial decision making diagram to show it (Figure 16).
The findings in our policy simulation study shows that, each policy has both strength and weakness
from managerial point of view in continuously developing high-tech B2B market. For example, the
“leaping” pace technology evolution and “reducing efforts of signing contract (e.g. reducing nonphysical cost)” can incite consumers to make purchase, but consumers are more likely to sign a
shorter contract, e.g. relatively less profitable. In fact, both the “leaping pace” technology evolution
and the “reducing non-physical cost” strategies are very common in high-tech B2C market. The
reason is that, in B2C world, consumers only decide on whether to buy or not which also determines
firms’ profit, therefore these two strategies perfectly matches firms’ need of inciting consumers to
buy. We can easily find examples in B2C world that belongs to the domain of these two strategies,
such as Apple who announces a new model of product only once every year and keeps silence in
between. Although consumers don’t have “contract efforts” in B2C world, they need to spend
“searching and comparing etc.” efforts on their decisions which also belongs to the “non-physical
cost”. The phenomena of opening new stores, providing online services and exhibiting products
for consumers to try and compare etc. show how the firms put in efforts on helping consumers to
reduce the “non-physical cost”. However, in B2B contractual market, service providers have to
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consider consumer’s both decisions because 1) their profit is mainly from the contract length
decision and 2) the contract length is conditional on consumer’s purchase decision. Therefore,
service providers make trade-off between the two policies within each scenario (Figure 16)
depending on which consumer’s decision they put on more weight in the current environment. For
instance, if a service provider is relatively new and aims to seize a share in the market, they may be
more willing to incite consumers to buy and try their new service. Then suggested by our findings,
it will be better for the firm to select the “leaping evaluation pace” or “reduce contract signing
effort” by offering consumers additional aid, because these two strategies can help elevate the
consumers’ purchase probability. On the other hand, if the firm is already very dominant in the
market and are primarily concerned about profit (e.g. contract length), then it will be better to select
the “jogging evaluation pace” or “increase the contract signing effort” by initiating strict and
inflexible contract policy to the consumer. Then according to our results, although consumers are
less inclined to make the purchase decision, if they still decide to buy or there is no other choices,
consumers tend to sign a longer contract.
Finally, since our policy simulation also provides a quantitative evaluation of the
consumer’s decision changes under different scenarios, service providers can combine our results
with their internal profit function to design the optimal strategy for profit maximization.
It is very straightforward to apply our decision making framework (Figure 16) to help
service providers on selecting a better strategy. First, we only need the consumer’s purchase data,
e.g. purchase time and purchase quantity (e.g. contract length) and the news released frequency data
to build the consumer dynamic model. If the news-count data is not available, the model can also
be flexibly revised for other type of “count” data representing technology evolution. Next, we can
perform the policy simulation by putting in different types of the policies, such as the pattern of
announcing technology evolution and the possible degree of “contract effort” decrease/increase
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from service provider’s side, and quantitatively compute the impact of each type of policy on
consumers’ two decisions: whether to buy and how long to buy. Then we can entail the policy
simulation findings to optimize service provider’s strategy plan and potential profitability.

Conclusion and Future Directions
In this study, we develop a new dynamic modeling approach to understand the impact of
technology evolution on consumer’s purchasing behaviors. In the model, we account for both
consumer heterogeneity and consumer’s forward-looking behaviors. Our model extends the current
dynamic model by introducing consumer’s continuous decision into the dynamic decision process.
This study makes significant contribution to the marketing literatures from both methodological and
substantive perspectives. From the modeling perspective, we develop an estimable dynamic model
to understand how consumers make the purchase decisions in a turbulent environment where the
technology is continuously developing. From the substantive domain, we provide insights into
consumer’s decision process under different scenario that can aid in manager’s decision making.
We show that, consumer’s sensitivity toward the technology evolution is remarkable thus improving
technology is an effective strategy on inciting consumer to make purchase. We address that, at
current stage of the high-tech service, consumers still rely more on the most recent information to
evaluate the technology evolution. We also empirically demonstrate that, both the pattern of
technology improvement and the efforts of signing a contract can affect consumer’s forwardlooking behaviors thus the consumer’s final decisions on both purchasing time and contract length.
Finally, our study still has several development spaces for future research. First, we only
have the news frequencies in our data to help us quantify the technology evolution function
(Equation (2)). If more information were available, we may be able to incorporate them into the
technology evolution function thus better quantify the technology improvement. Second, we
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assume a linear relationship in the technology evolution function. Although the technology
evolution model setup is still applicable in our study context after discussing and confirming with
the managers, it may not be applicable to other study context. It would be a good avenue for future
research to select a more flexible relationship in the technology evolution function, such as loglinear or multi-nomial etc.. Last, we assume that the news-count follows a Possion distribution in
our study. Although Poisson distribution is a well-utilized discrete distribution for “count” data, its
lack of flexibility in many applications is also well-documented, such as the over dispersion
problem. Future research can consider select a more flexible distribution to better quantify the
news-count distribution, for example, the negative binomial distribution etc.
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Figure 6. Graphically illustration of the parameter estimation process
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Figure 7. Graphical illustration of the monthly basis contract length and news-count per month
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Figure 8. Comparison the patterns of consumer’s value between different levels of overall
technology
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Figure 9. Comparison the patterns of consumer’s value between different levels of technology
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Figure 10. Relationship between cloud adopter’s value and two focal state variables
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Figure 12. Comparison of optimal decision time between jogging and leaping pace
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Figure 13. Comparison of optimal contract length decision between jogging and leaping pace
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Figure 14. Comparison of optimal decision time between two levels of “efforts of signing contract”
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Figure 15. Comparison of optimal contract length decision between two levels of “efforts of
signing contract”
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Figure 16. A Managerial Decision Making Diagram of Consumer’s Dynamic Purchasing Behavior
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Table 2. Simulation Results
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Table 3. Model Comparison Results
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Table 4. Parameter Estimations
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Appendix A – Computation of the value function
In this section, we describe the details of how we empirically solve the value function. To
simplify the expression, we neglect the consumer

subscripts. As we mentioned previously, in

our model, the consumers solve an infinite-horizon stationary Markov decision process in order to
optimize their current contract length decision. Ideally, we should iteratively compute the value
function until it converges at all decision time points. However, to reduce the computation burden,
we follow the “backsolving” method introduced by Erdem and Keane (2003). We select a terminal
period T and assume that: when the transit period beyond the terminal period T, consumer’s value
become zero at all state points (Erdem and Keane, 2003), e.g.

. The underlying

idea of this method is that, when consumers make current purchase decision, the utilities at far away
future is almost discounted to zero although consumers have forward looking behavior.
After we assume

, we can backwardly calculate the

using the value function in Equation (10). As addressed in Erdem and Keane’s study
(2003), in the “backsolving” computation procedure, we need to select an enough large terminal
period T in order to ensure that the value functions become stable. We follow the criteria specified
in Erdem and Keane’s study (1996) to find the terminal period T, e.g. if we fix the utility discount
factor at 0.9, a terminal period
study, we select a terminal period

is enough for finding a converged value function. In our
with the utility discount factor fixed at 0.9.

It is worth mentioning that, in our dynamic programming model, we have in total four state
variables

. All of the state variables are continuous. Therefore, as pointed out in

Erdem and Keane’s study (2003) that, we can’t solve value function for all potential state points.
Therefore, we need to use approximation method (Erdem and Keane, 2003). First, we define
“region” and “grid” for each state variable. Then, we can compute the exact result of value function
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at each “grid” points (Note: the grid points are defined by all state variables). Next, if the states of
the value function that we need don’t fall on the “grid” points, we will use the Kernel nonparametric regression (Altman, 1992) to find the approximate solution.
Then, we want to reduce the dimension of the state variables to both simplify the value
function computation process and ease the computation burden. We can use a simple example to
show why reducing the dimension of the state variables offers us the computation advantages.
Suppose we select 10 grids for each state for calculating the value function, and then we need to
compute value function for 104 grid points occupying a 4-dimensional matrix. If we can reduce the
dimension of state variables, the number of value function that we need to compute can be reduced
exponentially. We finally are able to reduce the dimension of state variables to 2-dimension and
the process is shown as follow:
First, we can integrate out the state variable of

in the value function because it is an

random component (Equation (1)), which means that

doesn’t depend on the value of

. Then the value function shown in Equation (10) can be re-defined as follow:
(̃ )

∫

(̃ )

∫

{∑

(̃

)

∫

(̃

)

(̃

|̃

)

}

∫

{∑

(̃

)

∫

(̃

)

(̃

|̃

)

}

Where ̃

̌

̃

and ̃

reduce the state variable space from 4-dimensional to 3-dimensional.
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; and we now can

Second, we know that, unlike the state variables of

and

, the parameter

is a

deterministic term and can be exactly computed by time because it has no relationship with the
unobserved or random components of

. Therefore, we can

create a new state variable by combining both

and

, e.g.

. This new state variable is

not a pure mathematical expression but have physical meaning. Recalled that in consumer learning
indicates consumer’s mean-level perception about

model (Equation (4));

, while

is the

actually suggests consumer’s

true-mean level of news released frequency. Therefore,

perception on the mean-level of the technology evolution pace. It is worth mentioning that,
reducing state space by replacing
The reason is that,
about

and

and

with

can create both

makes our value function non-stationary.
(e.g. consumer’s uncertainty

and

) influencing the value function at different period. Although we reduce the state space by

introducing

as the state variable, we lose control on the
(̃

probability and our value function becomes t-specific, e.g.
instead of ( ̃

|̃

(̃ )

)

thus both our transition
|̃

)

(̃ )

(̃ )

( ̃ ) respectively. Begin from here, we denote all

value function and transition probability as t-specific at a given the state space.
Last, we explain how we compute the maximization process in the value function. Let’s
first define another format of value function without the maximization notation, e.g.
(̃
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)

∑

(̃

)

∫

̃

(̃

)

(̃

|̃

)

(̃

Note, the difference between the value function
previously (either
(

( ̃ ) or or

( ̃ )) is that,

) defined here and those we defined

(̃

) is the function of both state variables

) and decision variable (contract length,

. In discrete dynamic model,

consumer’s decision space only contains two values: 0 = not purchase and 1 = purchase.
Therefore, we can identify consumer’s optimal decision only by compare the value function
between

(̃

(̃

) and

). However, in our study, the decision variable of contract length is a

continuous variable. Therefore, unlike the discrete dynamic model, we will need to iteratively
searching for the optimal decision point, and we use “Golden Search” method to reach the optimal
̃

decision at a given state, e.g.
(̃ )

∫

(̃ )

∫

only help us to find the

( (̃

(̃

)) and the associated value is

). Please note that the “Golden Search” method can

( (̃

)) for

because it is only applicable to finding the

extremum of a strictly unimodal function. Therefore, we also need to compare the “Golden Search”
result with the

(̃

) to find the value function:

(̃ )

( (̃

)

( (̃

)

)).

Now, we can simulate the value function as follow:
Step 1: Define the “region” and “grid” for the state variables. Now we have three groups
state variables (

) and can be separately integrated out like the unobserved components.

Therefore, we only need to define “region” and “grid” for
unobserved components, we can’t identify the exact “region” for
“

and

can be

and

is the overall technology level and
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. Because of the existence of
. The ideal region for

. But according to their physical meanings, e.g.
is the technology evolution pace, we can approximately use

the real data to help us define the “region” of them in the value function computation. Next,
suppose that we select M “grid” for both state variables. We can discretize the “region” of the state
variables by selecting “M” evenly distributed points, e.g.
Step 2: Assume terminal period T=150, and
value function we used here is

(̃ )

and

(̃

)

̃

should be

. Please note that, the

.

Step 3: At T=149, use equation (A2), we can compute the
to specify the “region” of

.

(̃

). Here, we also need

that we use to compute the value function. Ideally, the region of

. To reduce the computation burden, we will use the
(̃

upper limit for computing the value function of

Step 4: We use the iterative computation of
. The detailed steps are: first, we find the

).
(̃

) to help us identify the
( (̃

using “Goldern Search” method; then we compare the result with
finally, we can update the value function for

(̃

in the data as the

) using

( ̃ ) for

)) for
(̃

) to get
(̃ )

∫

(̃ )

( ̃ );
for all

combination of grid points. For any value that the “region” of the state variables doesn’t
belong to, we can use the “Kernel non-parametric regression” to find the approximated solution. At
the same time, we can also find the consumer’s decision rule at any given state, e.g.
̃ .
Step 5: Finalize the solution of value function by computing both
̃ to the time period of
.
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( ̃ ) and

, e.g. iteratively redo step 3 and 4 for

Appendix B – Empirical finding

at a given

This appendix describes how we empirically compute the
have close-form function for
and

when

iteratively find the solution of

, which means that, as

increases, the

. Therefore, we will use the bisection method to
at a given

. The detailed steps are described as follow:

Step 1: We need to compute the Value Function, e.g.
e.g. {

since we don’t

. We empirically observed that there is a monotonic

increasing relationship between
also increases for all

at a given

( ̃ ) at a given set of parameters,

} following the steps shown in Appendix (A).
Step 2: Assume an initial upper and lower bound of

corresponding

, e.g. e.g.

, e.g.

for computing the

. For example, we can select the

.
Step 3: We use the finalized

( ̃ ) to compute the

corresponding to

respectively. The process is very similar as the “step 3 and 4” defined in Equation
(A2): at a given

, first, we find the

( (̃

)) for

using “Goldern

Search” method; then we compare the result with ( ̃
̃

( (̃

)

( (̃

)

)).

Step 4: We can use the bisection method to find the exact
can find the upper limit of
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, e.g.

̃ where

) to find the

for all values of

for

. If

, we

Appendix C – Simplex Method for finding MLE
In this section, we describe the details of how we empirically solve the MLE using Nelder–
Mead Simplex Method (Nelder and Mead, 1965), which is a well-established numeric method for
searching for the extremum when the first-order derivative of the function can’t be analytically
solved.

Since this method targets at the “minimum” of the non-linear function with multi-

dimensional parameter space, we revise the process to find the “maximum” of
function in our study.

The detailed steps are described as follow:

Step 0: We select initial values for the m-dimension parameters in the likelihood function:
e.g. ̃

{

}. Then for each individual parameter, we add in a certain step-length

and keep other parameters unchanged so that we obtain the following vector space:
{̃

̃

̃

̃ }, which we name as the “simplex” (Nelder and Mead, 1965). To be clear of the

notation, we use

to denote the set of parameters; and use

to denote values of each individual

parameter.
Step 1: For each of the (m+1) set of parameters, we can compute the corresponding
. To simplify the exposition, we use
obtain ̃

{

} where

to denote the

. Therefore, we

outcome of parameter set ̃

is the

where

.
Step 2: We find the maximum and minimum in ̃ . We denote that:
̃

̃

( );

( ); ̃

̃

( ).

Step 3: We compute the centroid for each parameter, e.g. the ̅ where
denote the centroid for all parameters: ̅
81

( );

{ ̅

̅

̅

}

. We use ̅ to

Step 4: We will use three operators: reflection, contraction and expansion to replace one set
of the parameters in the “simplex”. The detailed steps are shown as below:
Step 5 (reflection): We compute the “reflection” as ̃
corresponding

as

Step 5-1: If

. The

̅

̃ and the

is an arbitrarily selected positive constant.

, then we replace the

and the associated ̃

with

with

̃ .
, then we compute the “expansion” as ̃

Step 5-2 (Expansion): If
̅ and the corresponding
constant. We replace the

with

Step 5-3 (contraction): If
̃

̃

a number between 0 and 1. If
with ̃ . If

as

. The

and the associated ̃

̃

is an arbitrarily selected positive
with ̃ .

, then we compute the “contraction” as
̅ and the corresponding
, then we replace the

as
with

. The

and the associated ̃

, then we compute a new (m+1) set of m-number parameters as:
; and the associated new (m+1) results of

̃ .
Step 6: If the
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is

( ̃)

, then we go to Step 2, otherwise, we finalize the results.

, e.g.

Appendix D – Computation of Jacobian in Likelihood Function
In this section, we describe the details of how we empirically compute the Jacobian, e.g.
‖

‖ in the Likelihood function. As described previously, there is no close-form

solution for

, we will need to empirically compute the Jacobian by iteration.

Fundamentally, the Jacobian of ‖

‖ is the partial derivative of

fundamental concept of partial derivative, e.g.

. We follow
and

we derive the detailed steps to empirically find the solution of

as follow:

Step 1: For a given set of parameters, we find the value function following the steps
described in Appendix A.
Step 2: At a given number of

and

empirically compute the corresponding and

, where

following the steps described in Appendix B.

Step 3: We can approximately compute the Jacobian as:
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is a very small value, we
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